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Methodology 
 
 Under the U.S. Constitution, emergency powers do not per se exist; therefore they must 
be defined by an amalgamation of precedent. For this paper, I am focused on executive use of 
emergency powers. The U.S. model for those executive powers can be defined through executive 
prerogative in the form of executive orders and congressional acquiescence. In comparing the 
U.S. model to nations that have adopted explicit constitutional emergency provisions, there are 
several factors analyzed in this paper: 1) constitutional language or precedent 2) historical basis 
for the model 3) examples of emergency power usage and 4) a summation of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the model.  
 
Introduction 
 
 At 8:46 a.m. the first tower was hit and at 9:30 a.m. the second one was hit. Fire, death 
and destruction engulfed an unsuspecting New York City. On September 11, 2001, widespread 
chaos ensued causing confusion throughout government. The questions of who did this and why 
inevitably crossed the minds of officials. However, the more pressing and immediate question 
for government officials: what do we do? The U.S. Constitution does not delegate any 
emergency powers to the branches of government. As a result, from a constitutional perspective 
the government is forced to delineate their own procedures in combating crisis in a sort of ad hoc 
means of addressing emergencies. 
 While this method of combating emergencies seems inefficient and dangerous, there is a 
constant balancing between security and freedom that comes into play. If government had 
constitutionally embedded emergency powers, it may more easily oppress its people in the name 
of security. For example, if there had been an emergency powers provision in the Constitution 
during 9/11 it may have called for civil liberties to be suspended until the emergency was over. 
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But then the question becomes – when does the emergency end? In reflection of the past several 
years, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed the U.S. to more 
terrorist threats constituting an “emergency.” However, the conflicts were resolved years after 
the conflicts began. Thus, the implication is that the U.S. was arguably in a state of national 
crisis for those several years until the completion of hostilities. During this national emergency, a 
number of civil liberties may be compromised or government power would be consolidated to 
address the emergency. Consequently, the outcome and danger of constitutional emergency 
powers is a government closer to totalitarianism rather than a democracy.  
This danger is epitomized by the rise of Nazi Germany during the Weimer Republic. 
Prior to World War II, Germany’s constitutional emergency powers came into effect when a fire 
erupted at the Reichstag parliament building, which was alleged to be a terrorist attack. The 
German government consolidated power and suspended civil liberties, ultimately resulting in the 
Nazi party taking power. While it is very unlikely that the U.S. will ever reach a stage of 
government oppression similar to Nazi Germany, the threat is abundantly clear that in time of 
emergency a country is faced with potential abuses of power.  
Accordingly, the U.S. Constitution was unique in that it established a separation of 
powers. However, because the Constitution is interpretative by its nature, a blurring of the lines 
between the branches of government occurs. During times of unrest a government’s ability to 
respond to threats quickly is a necessity. However, the rights of citizens often act as inadvertent 
obstructions to accomplishing certain national security goals. Consequently, concentrated 
executive powers and limitations during times of emergency are frequently solutions to national 
crisis.  
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The tendency of legislative power is to be cumbersome, slow and bureaucratic. As a 
result, the executive branch generally steps in to addresses immediate emergencies. While the 
U.S. has a long history of constitutional tension between balancing security and freedom, other 
nations have encountered similar issues generated by national emergencies. Accordingly, the 
constitutional traditions of other countries acknowledge that in some situations freedom may be 
affected by both foreign and domestic calamities, leading to increased flexibility of government 
intervention. 
Part I: Defining U.S. Emergency Powers  
Original Intent of the Executive Branch 
 While the U.S. Constitution is plagued by numerous uncertainties of what the framers 
originally intended when they drafted the document, it is clear that they intended executive 
power to be a necessary evil.
1
 This is evidenced by their early experimentation with the Articles 
of Confederation, which completely lacked an executive branch.
2
 In addition, to having no 
executive branch, the legislative branch was unicameral and responsible for all military action 
and foreign policy.
3
 Due to the numerous complications from the Articles of Confederation, the 
executive branch was created with an emphasis on efficiency in correcting the deficiencies of the 
Articles.  
Alexander Hamilton, stated in Federalist Papers Number 70
 stated “energy in the 
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.
4” This quote reflected the 
Framers’ intent in that the executive branch was meant to assume a prominent role in 
                                                 
1
 Eric M. Freeman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the 
Constitution From the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation. 60 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 783 (1994). 
2
 Id. 
3
 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-10 (1973). 
4
 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-2 (1973). 
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government. However, distinctively absent from the Constitution is a provision detailing 
emergency powers. Consequently, when emergencies occur the executive branch is one of the 
best means of dealing with threats. For instance, in regard to foreign threats, the president as an 
individual is generally far better able to reach quick decisions than congress. Debates and voting 
with a consensus require so much time that they are luxuries, which sometimes cannot be 
afforded, especially in times of military conflict. Furthermore, the President doesn’t have to deal 
with the practical concerns of securing majority agreement among 535 members of Congress
5
. 
As a result, the President was given vast powers in terms of foreign policy formulation and the 
ability to address conflicts efficiently. This is particularly important, because foreign powers may 
prompt military actions and consequently cause a nationwide emergency. 
However, because of the danger of oppression during an emergency, the Framers had the 
objective of avoiding a monarchy and sought to deny the president the British imperial 
prerogative of vesting war making powers with a sole ruler. The last clause of the Constitution 
Article I, Section 8 expressly prevents some of that by granting Congress the ability to declare 
war.
6
 But interestingly enough, at the same time, command of the Army and Navy was vested 
expressly with the president through the words “Commander in Chief” that is embedded in the 
constitution. This meant that once congress declared war, the president in his role would carry 
out this declaration in his capacity as leader. 
Accordingly, the legislative and executive branches, by design, were meant to have “joint 
possession,” as Hamilton would call it – in reference to the president’s ability to control matters 
                                                 
5
 Head. “Imperial Presidency 101 - Unitary Executive Theory and the Imperial Presidency.” 
http://civilliberty.about.com/od/waronterror/p/imperial101.htm 
6
 Id at 3. 
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of war and treaty making powers.
7
 This joint possession of powers implies that during 
emergencies, the executive and legislature would work together. But the interwoven 
responsibilities between the two branches resulted in competing interests at times. However, 
language in the constitution gave the president broad powers to execute the laws through the 
take-care clause and the necessary and proper clause to enact the will of the legislature, this is 
particularly useful when dealing with an emergency. 
This language allowed the president and executive to act when the law was not written or 
ambiguous
8
. The president, the inference is, should have the discretion to act for the public good 
to protect the country. In fact, the presidential oath of office explicitly states that the president 
will take all necessary measure to “preserve” and “protect” the Constitution of the U.S., an oath 
that is different from that of all other federal officials.
9
 As a result, there is an implicit tension at 
times between the executive branch acting to enforce the laws and protect the country and 
legislative branch’s objective to pass well thought out legislation reflecting the will of the 
people. Similarly, there is an implicit tension between the theme of freedom and the necessity of 
security.  
 According to the prominent historian Arthur Schlesinger, the U.S. Constitution was 
“established, for better or for worse, an idea new to the world in the eighteenth century – the idea 
of the separation of powers.
10” This illustrates the American contribution to the “art of 
government” with an inherent and institutionalized conflict between governmental branches11. 
But while checks and balances prevent power from being concentrated, it also prevents 
                                                 
7
 Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: the Federalist Papers as a Political 
Narrative, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 447 (1996).  
8
 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-15 (1973). 
9
 Fisher and Adler, American Constitutional Law 492-493 (2009). 
10
 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency vi-x (1973). 
11
 Id. at 1-5. 
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efficiency. Despite these tensions and difficulties created by the separation of powers, the U.S. 
Constitution has no provision allowing for exceptions during national emergencies even though 
the Framers’ would have inevitably known that emergency circumstances may arise.  
 Based on original intent, it appears that the Framers’ intentionally left out emergency 
powers and that governance during an emergency should be a joint venture. The probable reason 
for leaving out such a strong power is the potential for abuse and the fear of monarchy. 
Therefore, it’s arguable that the very notion of emergency powers may run contrary to the 
Framers’ intent when crafting the constitution. But when abiding by a strict constitutional 
perspective, the result may be detrimental to the overall nation’s well-being when threats are 
encountered. Thus, over the course of U.S. constitutional history, presidents have adopted their 
own methods of dealing with crisis outside of normal constitutional provisions under a theory of 
implicit powers. These implied powers consist primarily of legislation and executive orders.  
Executive Action and Congressional Acquiescence 
During an emergency the executive may implement a number of provisions to address the 
problem but these actions may be repugnant from a separation of powers perspective. This 
includes the use of executive orders and congressional acquiescence of power. During an 
emergency, the president may issue an executive order instructing his executive officials and 
agencies to do certain actions with the full-force of law. Similarly, in the midst of crisis, congress 
may see value to the executive action and may yield their authority in favor of an executive 
dealing with an imminent crisis. This doctrine of “congressional acquiescence” has been 
implemented by the executive branch throughout history to push the limits of executive power 
during an emergency.  
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Consequently, the U.S. model in terms of emergency power is characterized primarily by 
affirmative actions taken by the executive and legislative silent consent of executive actions. Few 
instances in U.S. history have reached the level of constitutional crisis comparable in the 
American Civil War. Constitutionally, the Civil War was a foreseeable but unique predicament 
that left many more questions than answers. The nation was divided geographically and 
politically with a splintered Congress and no precedent to guide government in addressing the 
situation.  
One of the most striking examples of a president acting to combat an emergency is in the 
form of President Lincoln suspending habeas corpus.
12
 This prevented the accused from 
appearing before a judge who would access the legality of the imprisonment. But by suspending 
habeas corpus, the accused prisoner could be held indefinitely without trial. However, Lincoln’s 
actions were in contradiction with Article I Section 9 of the Constitution which explicitly stated 
that the right of habeas corpus cannot be suspended unless in time of rebellion by Congress
13
. 
Lincoln thereby explicitly encroached upon congressional power on behalf of the executive 
branch; this power was acquiesced by congress.   
In Ex parte Milligan the ultimate issue of the case was whether or not President Lincoln, 
in time of national emergency, could suspend the writ of habeas corpus contrary to the 
constitution and order a military trial of a U.S. citizen.
14
 The Supreme Court ruled that the 
suspension of habeas corpus was constitutional given the circumstances of Civil War – thereby 
implying an emergency power by the executive. However, while Lincoln acted unilaterally to 
                                                 
12
 Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12 
Chap. L. Rev. 439 (2009). 
13
 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency vi-x (1973). 
14
 Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law 267-268 (1
st
 ed. 2007); Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. 2, 10 (1866).  
. 
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suspend habeas corpus, the presidential act itself was justified through congressional legislative 
power later on. The Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 was passed, which acquiesced the 
power to suspend from Congress to President Lincoln.
15
  
While the precedent of Ex Parte Milligan is limited, the implication is clear for 
emergencies. The Habeas Corpus Act was passed retroactively after Lincoln suspended the right 
of habeas corpus; thus the power was acquiesced on behalf of the Congress. Justice Jackson 
stated in his concurrence in Ex Parte Milligan that the Constitution only explicitly allows for the 
suspension of one right (habeas corpus) and thus the implication was that government is held to a 
high standard in regard to civil liberties and would only be suspended when necessary.
16
 But as a 
result, the precedent stands that when there is a legislative deficiency in action, the President 
may step in and if there is no Congressional objection the President may proceed with what 
action he deems fit.  
 However, the presidential power during emergencies is not unlimited and congress or the 
judiciary may easily put a stop to executive prerogatives. When the legislative or executive 
branch objects to an executive action the president is constrained. Almost 100 years after the 
Civil War, President Truman attempted to seize the production operations of a number of steel 
factories that were striking during the Korean War in Youngstown Steel. The court eventually 
held that the President’s actions were tantamount to lawmaking, thus infringing upon the 
legislative branch’s power.17.  
During emergencies, congressional acquiescence presents a novel way for presidents to 
maneuver constitutional restrictions in order to address national emergencies. However, when 
congress does not acquiesce, the president is constrained despite the emergency conditions. The 
                                                 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 634. 
17
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 579-709 (1952).  
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decision in Youngstown Steel was in keeping with the separation of powers doctrine and the 
Framers’ intent that the branches govern jointly to prevent tyranny. But in the midst of an 
emergency, certain civil liberties are generally constrained.   
Executive Power during an Emergency 
During an emergency, civil liberties are inevitably limited to some extent in the name of 
security but vary given the circumstances. A full scale war is an extreme but generally 
uncontroversial category of emergency that prompts use of special executive powers. Executive 
powers are generally used because they have the full force of law and allow for the executive to 
act immediately. For instance, in Hirabayashi V. United States, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
President Roosevelt issued an executive order placing restrictions on the civil liberties of 
Japanese-Americans in terms of mandated time curfews to better control the movement of 
possible enemy sympathizers.
18
 The order was upheld as constitutional where the court 
concluded that the curfew was not beyond the scope of legislative/executive power in the 
presence of wartime circumstances. However, due to the restraints on liberty resulting from the 
curfew, it was placed under a rational basis analysis and held to be valid. 
 Similarly, in Korematsu V. United States an executive order was issued where all 
Japanese-Americans were to be detained and put into quasi-concentration camps, under the 
suspicion that subterfuge may occur from wartime collaborators of Japanese origin. Civil rights 
were essentially nullified despite no evidence of crimes or terrorism.
19
 The court ruled that these 
restrictions were to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny analysis. But given the nature of the 
ongoing war effort and the threats posed by the Japanese it was believed that public necessity 
fostered the need for restrictions on civil rights. The emergency powers implication of 
                                                 
18 Hirabayashi V. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 81-113 (1943). 
19
 Korematsu v. United States, U.S. 214, 214-248 (1944). 
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Hirabayashi and Korematsu illustrate that there are very few limitations on executive power 
when the gravity of the circumstances mandate that some civil liberties are limited in the name of 
security. However, the balancing test between security and civil liberties is generally of more 
freedom when the emergency is not immediate.  
In comparison, the Bush Administration in 2001 in response to 9/11 worked to implement 
the Patriot Act, thereby allowing for more effective combating of terrorism.
20
 Consequently, the 
National Security Agency was authorized to monitor, without warrants any phone or internet 
communication that involved suspected terrorists overseas through executive order to enforce the 
Patriot Act. This patent use of emergency power as justification for infringement of the Fourth 
Amendment is one of the more controversial measures of the executive.  
Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld a U.S. citizen was captured in a warzone and detained 
without access to an attorney and did not have any notice of any charges against him for being an 
enemy combatant.
21
 The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the executive branch 
has the authority to detain citizens who are labeled enemy combatants without civilian due 
process of law. The court held that the president has the power to detain enemy combatants 
because of executive war powers – therefore the initial detention was at least lawful, citing Ex 
Parte Milligan.
22
 However, the court stated that the detained should at least be given due process 
in order to challenge his detention. In addition, the court stated that there is always a fear of 
vesting too much power in a single branch and the judiciary acts as a check on executive power. 
Thus the implication was that even in wartime or an arguable emergency, due process and civil 
liberties should be upheld whenever possible but there are situations that may mandate executive 
intervention. 
                                                 
20
 18 U.S.C. § 2331 
21
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
22
  Id. at 521. 
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Legislative Power during an Emergency 
The potential of emergency executive power is great for abuse in the American model; 
there are a variety of limitations and checks on power that safeguard liberty. While, there are no 
formal emergency powers in the U.S. Constitution, the legislative branch makes laws that 
outlines what sorts of measures can or can’t be taken by the executive, notwithstanding 
congressional acquiescence. 
For instance, the Posse Comitatus Act in concert with the Insurrection Act was passed to 
ensure that federal troops could not unilaterally enter a state to enforce state law and put down 
unrest.
23
 Naturally, during an emergency assistance from federal troops under the guidance of the 
executive branch may be helpful, especially in case of rebellion. However, by allowing the 
executive branch power to send troops to a state gives the executive too much power especially 
during an emergency; hence, the legislative prohibition. 
In addition, when there is an emergency or potential emergency the legislature has passed 
laws to place limit the potential for abuse. The right of privacy is typically one of the first rights 
to be diminished in exchange for security. In 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) was passed to prevent the executive from trampling on civil liberties through 
wiretapping.
24
 The act outlined a list of procedures for the executive to use when investigating 
potential terrorist or criminal suspects through physical or electronic searches.  
In contrast, when the circumstances of September 11
th
 required more invasive searches 
and investigatory techniques, the legislature in response passed the Patriot Act to grant the 
executive more power to combat terrorism. This included provisions in the act that allowed for 
enhanced domestic security, more scrutiny for financial transactions, and ultimately easier 
                                                 
23
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1385 
24
 36 U.S.C.A. 36 § 1801 
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surveillance procedures in contrast to the FISA Act. Thus, when the situation presented itself, the 
legislature allowed for greater flexibility for the executive with fewer restraints on civil liberties. 
Consequently, the implication is that even during time of emergency, rather than a 
constitutional provision outlining what to do during an emergency, congress frequently adjusts 
and passes legislation accordingly. This approach limits the amount of governmental interference 
with civil rights, while allowing the government to implement some emergency provisions if 
needed. As a result, despite the lack of constitutional mandate, the government is not limited in 
addressing potential emergencies. 
Part II: Comparative Perspective 
German Constitutional Emergency Powers 
 The constitutional history of Germany parallels the United States experimentation with 
executive power. While the Articles of Confederation emphasized a lack of an executive, the 
Weimer Republic Constitution focused on executive power as a means to addressing 
emergencies with an explicit provision in the form of Article 48.
25
 The article allowed the 
president to use executive power to combat an emergency without legislative consent. As a result 
of this narrow explicit provision, the executive was able to exercise quasi-dictatorial powers.
26
 
 Article 48 detailed that the president, during time of upheaval may use armed forces to 
compel the government if it is not fulfilling its duties.
27
 In addition, the president may suspend a 
number of fundamental rights detailed in the constitution such as habeas corpus, right to privacy, 
                                                 
25
 Andras Jakab, German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on State of  Emergency – Paradigms and Dilemmas of a 
Traditional (Continental) Discourse, German Law Journal Vol.5 No.7, 453, 453-478 (2005).  
26
 C.J. Friederich, The Development of the Executive Power in Germany, American Political Science Review, (1933) 
at 150; Jenny Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective 15 Yale L.J. 2480, 2480-2510 
(2006). 
27
 Constitution of the German Reich of 1919, Art. 48.  
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and protection against search and seizure.
28
 Initially, Article 48 was used to combat economic 
crisis which allowed for the dissolving of the parliament and the calling of new elections in order 
to get certain legislation passed.
29
 In addition, it was used to combat a number of small rebellions 
and unrest garnered by economic depression. However, under the Nazi regime, Article 48 was 
used in conjunction with the Reichstag Fire Decree to suppress dissidents and civil liberties of 
citizens.
30
 A fire broke out in the Reichstag parliament building and was alleged to be from a 
communist or anarchist insurrection, despite little to no proof. As a result, political opponents of 
the Nazis were imprisoned which paved the way for the rise of Hitler. 
 However, under Article 48 there was a provision requiring legislative notification and 
approval of emergency.
31
 In fact, Article 48 has many similarities with some broad emergency 
powers in some modern constitutions such as Russia. But even with the legislative oversight, 
dictatorial power was achieved. Consequently, the implication is that even with an emergency 
power with a legislative check on the executive, power may be still abused. As a result of these 
lessons, the modern German Constitution has a comparatively weak executive branch with few 
emergency powers outlined for the executive. In addition, the modern German constitution is 
very detailed and outlines with specificity most constitutional provisions to the point of 
cumbersomeness. The level of detail is reflective of Germany’s bloody past and is intended to 
avoid any ambiguity leading to the possibility of dictatorship.  
In fact, Article I of the Constitution states that human dignity is the foremost priority and 
the suspension of human rights is also barred to prevent future abuse.
32
 Power is largely vested in 
the legislature, where the parliament can remove individual executive ministers and can vote out 
                                                 
28
 Id. 
29
 Jakab at 453-478.   
30
 Id. at 
31
 Constitution of the German Reich of 1919, Art. 48. 
32
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 1. 
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the head of state chancellor through a vote of no confidence.
33
 This legislative emphasis is 
illustrated by the vesting of war powers with the legislature, which may expedite the legislative 
process during war or an emergency but must nevertheless authorize all military action.  
 In Article 81 of the modern German constitution, there is a power to call a state of 
legislative emergency which is vests most of the power within the legislature as opposed to the 
executive in dealing with emergency situation. This method of vesting the ability to call a state 
of emergency with the legislature prevents abuses of power akin to Nazi Germany. Foreign and 
domestic threats are constitutionally separated in a similar way to the United States. Internal 
threats are constitutionally handled explicitly by German police forces, whereas foreign threats 
are handled by armed forces and must be addressed legislatively. But during states of emergency, 
armed forces are granted extra special domestic powers, such as the protection of private 
property or perform traffic duties to the extent necessary to protect the country.
34
  
But what is unique about the German model for dealing with emergencies is the lack of 
executive enforcement with little if any involvement. The German Chancellor acts more of a 
subordinate to the legislature, instead of the American President who acts in concert with 
Congress. Furthermore, the detail of legislative emphasis and the lack of executive mention 
regarding how emergencies should be handled in comparison to the U.S., illustrates a fear of 
executive power. However, some rights are reluctantly lessened during emergencies such as 
freedom of movement and right to privacy in homes may be explicitly limited during times of 
                                                 
33
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.115a. 
34
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 87-A (3) and (4) (“During a state of defense or a state of 
tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to 
the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. Moreover, during a state of defense or a state of tension,  
the Armed Forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of civilian  
property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.) 
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emergency.
35
 But these are very limited and the constitution even provides for a method of 
redress in the event that constitutional power is allegedly abused. 
Accordingly, most of Germany’s emergency power comes from legislative direction. 
Article 81 details “legislative emergencies” which upon agreement of the legislature, the 
president, in conjunction with the chancellor, may ask the legislature to declare a state of 
legislative emergency that expedites the legislative process.
36
 As a result, certain pieces of 
legislation may be streamlined and get through to combat the emergency. A federal chancellor 
can only do legislative expediting one time per term of chancellor.  
In addition, in Article 91 the German Constitution allows for the use of police force to 
combat an “internal emergency.” For foreign external threats during the state of defense, the 
executive is only allowed to address the problem with troops to address the problem “insofar as 
necessary to combat the threat.” This threat from external forces is called a “state of defense” 
and declared by the legislature and allows the federal government to pass laws that all federation 
states must abide by even if power is encroached upon. In addition, the constitution only 
provides for restrictions on human rights only in external emergencies, not regular states of 
emergency.
37
 As a result, the state of defense must be declared by the legislature upon request by 
the executive even if a threat is imminent. This illustrates the cumbersomeness of the model and 
the merits of the American model. For example, the United States used legislation in the form of 
the War Powers resolution giving legislative oversight of actions of hostility without the 
constraint of a constitutional procedure. Whereas, in Germany, if a foreign threat is attempting to 
invade the country a state of defense is a legislative hurdle the government must overcome 
                                                 
35
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.13 and  17a 
36
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.81 
37
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.115C(2). 
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before anything can be done. Consequently, German executive powers are best described as a 
legislative centric model, as opposed to the U.S. model. 
Russia’s Emergency Power 
In contrast to the German constitutional model of legislative emphasis, Russia 
emphasizes executive prerogative in governance. Both countries represent two extremes in 
regard to how from a constitutional perspective a country should deal with a national emergency. 
Russia’s tumultuous history resonates with its current constitutional model of government, 
similar to Germany but from a different historical perspective. After many years of communist 
rule, Russia’s current constitution delegates various powers to their executive branch. These 
powers give the executive great latitude from a constitutional perspective in using unilateral 
powers compared to the United States. One of the most powerful executive acts the Russian 
President has is the power to declare a national emergency, as outlined in the constitution.
38
 
However, there are a number of notable limitations on the executive that constrain it from 
concentrating too much power.  
One of the most powerful actions the Russian President can do is declare a state of 
emergency pursuant to Article 88 of the Constitution. The language states: “The President of the 
Russian Federation, in the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure envisaged 
by federal constitutional law, shall introduce a state of emergency on the territory of the Russian 
Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately inform the Council of Federation 
and the State Duma of this.”39 As defined, the state of emergency is in place to “ensure the safety 
of citizens and the protection of the constitutional order.”40 In addition, certain restrictions may 
                                                 
38
 Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 88. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
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be imposed on human rights and freedoms during the state of emergency.
41
 However, some 
rights may not be restricted as explicitly outlined in the constitution; the right to counsel, 
protections against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and habeas corpus.
42
 While these 
limitations provide some constraint on the executive, it nevertheless is clearly the dominant 
branch in the constitution.  
One of the most striking executive powers outlined in the constitution is the president’s 
ability to unilaterally dissolve the State Duma and call for new elections. Presumably, the logic 
behind the constitutional provision is that a president needs the support of the Duma to act 
efficiently with legislative support. However, during a state of emergency the constitution is 
explicitly precludes dissolution of the Duma.
43
But this power has the potential to be a powerful 
political weapon to solidify the president’s position and could be easily abused prior to a state of 
emergency for the benefit of the president. It would allow the president to oust political 
dissidents who would normally act as a check on executive power.  
In fact, Boris Yeltsin during the early years of the new constitution of the Russian 
Federation implemented those powers with great success. He dissolved the Duma for the purpose 
of ousting former communists who were still present after the fall of the Soviet Union. While 
Yeltsin was not nefarious in his purpose and his actions ultimately benefitted the country as a 
whole, there is a great potential for abuse in the future. Hypothetically, this dissolution could 
occur and the president could install his own supporters then call a state of emergency with great 
executive power.
44
  
                                                 
41
 Id. 
42
 Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 56. 
43
 Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 109. 
44
 Ara Balilkian, The New Russian Federation Constitution: A Legal Framework Adopted and Implemented in a 
Post-Soviet Era, 18 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 237 (1995). 
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The executive emphasis in the constitution is also seen through other provisions in the 
constitution. For instance, if the president is responsible for misconduct, impeachment 
proceedings can occur but are limited and very improbable during a national emergency. The 
process begins with a vote in the legislature which is then turned over to the courts which 
determines whether or not the president is guilty or innocent. Then the matter is turned over to a 
Federal Council which decides whether to impeach or reject the matter. A strict time limit of 
three months for an impeachment proceeding is required and exceeding that constraint will 
ultimately lead to dismissal.
45
  
As a result, it’s very hard if not unlikely a Russian President can be impeached much less 
so during a national emergency. While the age of Soviet totalitarianism is over for Russia, the 
fact remains that the executive branch in Russia is one of the most powerful and is capable of 
doing most anything during a time of emergency. The Russian President’s executive power 
during an emergency appears backward and quasi-dictatorial but at the same the power is not 
necessarily unique. 
The limited checks on power in regard to the Russian President are particularly important 
because the executive is in control of the ministries responsible for addressing an emergency: 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, 
Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM). The Ministry 
of Defense is in charge of external emergencies and combating terrorism, whereas EMERCOM 
is responsible for emergencies stemming from civil defense and dealing with natural disasters. In 
contrast to domestic threats, foreign enemies and threats are also addressed at the direction of the 
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president and ministry of defense, who must seek approval to institute martial law on the 
country.
46
  
However, because the Russian Constitution is broad like the U.S. model, the legislature 
must fill in the gaps to address certain situations. Specifically to deal with terrorism, the Russian 
government passed an anti-terror act called “On the Fight Against Terrorism.”47 The act allows 
for authorities to restrict movements of private citizens when necessary and force a citizen to 
show identification papers and detain the citizen until identity can be established. Some of the 
more intrusive provisions even include free warrantless entrance into homes in the course of 
“suppressing terrorism.” The U.S. Patriot Act pales in comparison to the provisions of the 
Russian anti-terrorist equivalent. But the act is reflective of the emphasis on executive force and 
efficient overwhelming use of force. Consequently, the executive-centric model on emergency 
powers focuses more on efficiency and completing an objective rather than emphasizing civil 
liberty protection. 
France’s Executive Emergency Power 
In France, the President has significantly less powers as the Russian President when there 
is a state of emergency. The state of emergency in the modern French Constitution of 1958 is 
codified in Article 16 of their constitution and contains some of the broadest grants of emergency 
power to an executive, merely stating: 
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its 
territory, or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under grave and 
immediate threat and when the proper functioning of the constitutional governmental 
authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures 
demanded by these circumstances after official consultation with the Prime Minister, the 
Presidents of the Assemblies, and the Constitutional Council.
48
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 Despite the broadness of the article the state of emergency and subsequent actions must 
be “prompted by a will to ensure within the shortest possible time that the constitutional 
governmental authorities have means of fulfilling their duties.”49 Though this is open to 
interpretation, it illustrates the desire to end emergency action as soon as practicable to avoid the 
fear of a perpetual state of emergency and the dangers of unchecked executive power. Similar to 
the Russian Constitution, it explicitly outlines that the legislature can only be dissolved but not 
during an emergency. In addition, when martial law is granted by the executive, it cannot exceed 
more than 12 days unless the legislature authorizes it.
50
 
 Article 16 was only implemented once in response to a rebellion in French controlled 
Algeria in 1961.
51
 During the emergency, the president issued 18 orders of which included: 
censorship in the territory, harsh punishments for rebels and sympathizers, and the use of 
military courts. Since the Algerian rebellion and succession, Article 16 has not been 
implemented but instead the executive branch and legislature have used normal constitutional 
powers without going to the extent of a “state of emergency” in addressing national issues.  
In this capacity, the executive branch issued decrees similar to executive orders using 
existing legislation to justify curfews and searches by authorities. These decrees are used as 
emergency powers but not widespread to the point of classifying the nation in a state of 
emergency.
52
 Typically, these decrees are implemented via the executive branch with legislative 
consent and used to quell riots and other forms of limited unrest. As a result, the decrees are 
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similar to executive orders in the U.S., where the executive branch has the ability to govern its 
own affairs and manage issues as they arise.  
For instance, an emergency decree was issued by the French President in order to quell 
strikes at oil refineries by essential workers, which resulted in a fuel shortage. The decree gave 
police authority to break up the strikes; in addition force the workers to return back to work – a 
stark contrast to Youngstown Steel in the U.S. The French President has also at times placed 
curfews on the population in order to combat rioting and crime via executive emergency 
decrees.
53
 Consequently, the French model is similar to the model in the U.S. with joint 
possession of executive powers but with legislative oversight and a broad emergency provision. 
South Korea’s Emergency Power 
 
 In keeping with the tradition of France, South Korea acknowledges the necessity of some 
sort of emergency power but with legislative notification and checks against the executive. 
Under Article 76 of the South Korean Constitution it outlines broad executive emergency powers 
for the executive. An emergency is explicitly defined as: “a time of internal turmoil, external 
menace, natural calamity, or a grave financial or economic crisis.”54 During an emergency, the 
president is given power to act to maintain the public order when the legislature hasn’t had the 
ability to convene.  
 Most startling is South Korea’s executive power in relation to national security 
emergencies, which are akin to Weimer Constitutional provisions. When major hostilities 
threaten national security, the President gains a quasi-legislative power in which he may issue 
orders having the effect of law. The constitution limits the president in terms of this power by 
specifying that the power is only allowed “when it is required to preserve the integrity of the 
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nation, and it is impossible to convene the National Assembly.”55 While the president is required 
to notify the legislature, this broad language is still very interpretative and resembles the Article 
48 of the Weimer Constitution. But nevertheless legislative mandate is required implying 
somewhat of a check on executive power and is significantly less powerful than previously.
56
  
 However, the somewhat cautious language of the constitution is reflective of its 
emergency powers in their earlier constitutions. South Korea in its young history has gone 
through a total of six constitutions due to political and military overthrows of government 
abusing the constitutional power of emergency. In the first South Korean Constitution, 
emergency powers were also in place but like so many other constitutions the executive abused 
that power. President Rhee in the midst of the impending Korean War conflict declared a state of 
emergency.
57
  
But in the course of the emergency, the President used the situation to take advantage of 
his political opponents and intimidate the legislature to pass laws to secure the presidential 
reelection. He also forced the change of the method of election of president to a direct popular 
vote, contrary to legislative opposition during martial law. After numerous power grabs during 
emergencies and martial law, Rhee pushed a controversial amendment eliminating presidential 
term limits. As a result, Rhee won reelection for four terms of alleged rigged elections; a military 
coup resulted in decades of dictatorial rule under constitutional emergency powers. 
58
 
Under this military dictatorship, the self-proclaimed President General Park Chung-hee 
drafted a new constitution and enjoyed a “blanket power of emergency.” He declared a state of 
emergency and put the country under martial law for two years from 1960-1962. When political 
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opposition began to grow over his rule, he declared martial law again in 1964 under the same 
premise.
59
 Over the course of his presidency, President Park Chung-hee passed laws censoring 
speech, political discourse, and eventually suspended the activities of the legislature in the name 
of emergency. However, upon Chung-hee’s retirement, the country’s freedom gradually returned 
to western democracy standards.  
 The modern constitution, interestingly enough still has emergency powers despite many 
years of abuse. Consequently, while the modern South Korean constitution acknowledges 
emergency powers, it has very good reason to place checks on executive power. The checks on 
power consist mostly of giving the legislative branch notification of emergency powers so that 
they may end abuses. This is in keeping with the French and German tradition of legislative 
oversight in terms of executive emergency power. However, the South Korean constitution is not 
as expansive of encompassing as the Russian constitution in delegating power.   
 Under Article 75 of the constitution, it allows the president to issue decrees similar to the 
French model and the U.S. model of executive signing statements but during a state of 
emergency a president’s decrees can be given force of law.60 But states of emergency must be 
approved by the legislature in order to be in effect. Similarly, the president must request the 
legislature to declare martial law and at the legislature’s discretion, the martial law will be 
terminated. Consequently, the new constitution reflects far more constrained emergency powers 
but with executive and legislative involvement.  
Conclusion 
 
 What makes the U.S. Constitution unusual is its subtle acknowledging of emergencies all 
while it disregards outlining specific emergency powers with the exception of habeas corpus 
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suspended during an a rebellion, a power reserved only to the legislature. A lack of an 
emergency power doesn’t imply that it is nonexistent but instead that it should be a power 
limited to a very small number of situations. The number one threat the founding fathers wanted 
to avoid was the potential of an American monarchy. In fact, the focus on legislative and 
executive flexibility when dealing with not just emergencies but matters in general provide a 
great basis for keeping power in check. 
 The American Republic has survived over 200 years without an emergency power but 
nonetheless has encountered a number of emergencies without any threat of dictatorial takeover. 
The historical record of stability and division of power is telling of how efficient the lack of 
explicit emergency powers is when dealing with potential power consolidation. In response to 
potential emergencies, the executive coupled with legislative oversight have passed a number of 
pieces of legislation and created a number of executive agencies to deal with emergencies despite 
a constitutional mandate. The justification of the creation of these methods is outlined in the 
broad language of the constitution to address issues on a case by case basis. As a result, there is a 
high level of flexibility with a high level of oversight for all emergency actions. 
 The German model is a legislature-centric model focused on having the legislature 
implement state of emergency procedures with the executive merely acting as a means to an end. 
The American model is ideally focused on having both legislative and executive acting in 
harmony with one another in passing and executing legislative acts. While the German model 
merely expedites the process of which legislation gets passed during an emergency, the U.S. 
executive can simply act in accordance with executive prerogative and address the issue 
immediately. Consequently, the German legislative model is somewhat of an overabundance of 
legislative authority in this regard. 
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 When dealing with foreign policy matters, an executive is essential because of the ease of 
decision-making. Thus, an emergency like a wartime situation is best suited for an executive to 
handle. The U.S. is able to use legislative acts to better define certain situations but the executive 
is not prevented from simple emergency procedures. The U.S. model, however, does not go 
nearly as far as the Russian model in which the executive is clearly the most powerful branch of 
government and is able to bully its way into a legislative concurrence.  
 In comparison, the U.S. executive is explicitly barred from the type of actions unilateral 
actions that are akin to quasi-legislative engagements. Youngstown Steel is a prime example of 
how the U.S. executive is limited in his ability to act in accordance with an emergency while 
preserving the emphasis on civil liberties that the Germanic constitutional model provides.  
However, the executive is also tarnished by its ability to historically consolidate power to 
accomplish goals which are repugnant in retrospect to civil liberties.  
 Executive orders and signing statements are some of the most broad and easiest way for 
the U.S. president to implement his policies immediately. While nationwide emergencies are 
fertile ground for executive orders, they are exceptionally hard to limit if abuses occur. For 
instance, the legislative and judicial branches do have the power to place checks on the president 
if he is acting against the interests of the constitution. But at the same time their checks are 
somewhat inefficient. In analyzing the facts and the court’s ruling in Youngstown Steel, the 
judicial check on the executive came in the form of a lengthy Supreme Court decision preventing 
executive action. This method is burdensome and time consuming for the damaged party who 
must wait for the court to render a decision all while the executive is acting upon his prerogative.  
The French model is most similar to the U.S. in that the majority of emergency actions 
are handled through executive decrees and legislation. However, there is a broad provision in 
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place in the constitution outlining national emergencies. But even with the provision, there is 
little guidance during emergencies and actions by the government supplemented with unilateral 
executive action or legislation. As a result, the ultimate outcome is similar to the U.S. model with 
little or no difference. 
However, the problem with specific outlined constitutional provisions is the fact sensitive 
nature of emergencies in general. Emergencies can take many forms which is reflective of the 
problems with the modern German constitution. External and internal emergencies are 
distinguished in the German constitution and a number of detail procedures of what can and 
can’t be done are outlined. But in the event that the constitution did not outline provisions 
dealing with an unanticipated emergency, the government’s abilities are limited and may not be 
able to address the emergency effectively. For instance, the German constitution does not 
characterize economic emergencies as “emergencies” in the constitutional sense. Thus, a 
devastating economic depression may be just as devastating as an external threat but may not be 
addressed in an effective way because of the constitutional limits. 
While a 9/11 scenario in the U.S. presents a number of uncertainties and the appeal of a 
German model with predictable outcomes is appealing but also inefficient. The flexibility of the 
U.S. model is its greatest strength and allows the U.S. government to address a multitude of 
emergencies the legislature and executive deem appropriate without being constrained to a 
certain formula of solving the emergency. Consequently, despite the disadvantage of uncertainty, 
the U.S. model is an appropriate and efficient means of dealing with emergencies. 
Based off the American model, any recommendations to a new budding constitution in a 
country such as Egypt should include some sort of acknowledgement of emergency power but 
not necessarily in the form of a broad explicitly outlined provision. However, first and foremost, 
27 
 
the country should have a bill of rights outlining what rights can and cannot be suspended and 
for how long. In addition, there should be legislative and executive flexibility when dealing with 
emergencies and constitutional powers granting them – such as the ability for an executive to 
issue the equivalent of U.S. executive orders. Broad emergency provisions should be avoided to 
avoid a Weimer Republic situation where despite legislative oversight; power can be easily 
consolidated and taken advantage of by an executive. 
While a broad emergency provision does not entail abuse, like in the French Model, the 
potential is always there and it is best to avoid that situation all together. The histories of various 
countries inevitably reveal the danger of emergency power. Therefore, in balancing the interests 
of freedom and security, a new constitution should err on the side of caution by outlining a 
specific bill of rights but not to the point of inefficiency such as in the modern German model. 
Consequently, a joint possession of broad powers by an executive and legislature in an ad hoc 
manner with an emphasis on flexibility on a case by case basis is the best means of addressing 
emergencies.    
